Parliament bill

Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill

Royal assent · Introduced by Hon Paul Goldsmith · National Party

Last checked
September 01, 2026 22:00
Source captured
September 01, 2026 22:00
Source
View on Parliament.nz

What this bill does

The bill passed its first reading by voice vote; no party or individual counts were recorded. According to the bill’s explanatory material, serious and complex fraud investigations increasingly need digital evidence, but the Serious Fraud Office’s 1990 search and evidence rules have not kept pace. The bill aims to help the Serious Fraud Office investigate and prosecute serious or complex fraud using updated search powers and evidence rules. The bill lets the Serious Fraud Office seek warrants for places, physical things and remotely accessed digital material, with broader powers to access, copy and secure evidence; it also applies the Evidence Act test to unlawfully obtained evidence in new criminal proceedings.

AI-assisted summary based on the bill text and linked Hansard debates.

Latest voting result

April 30, 2026
First reading: Passed Voice vote

Decision recorded by voice vote; no individual or party counts were recorded.

View the vote in Hansard

Arguments raised in Parliament

AI-assisted summary of the linked Hansard debates. Each point is grounded in the cited transcript.

Arguments for

The bill would let the Serious Fraud Office obtain digital evidence from devices and cloud storage, allowing it to investigate modern fraud that current rules obstruct.

Allowing the Serious Fraud Office to make oral warrant applications to authorised issuing officers would speed searches and preserve evidence that might otherwise be destroyed or tampered with.

Giving Serious Fraud Office investigators authority to exclude people and access on-site electricity or internet would protect evidence integrity and investigator safety at warrant sites.

Replacing the SFO’s older admissibility test with the Evidence Act approach would give courts a more balanced assessment of unlawfully obtained evidence, including urgency, safety, and offence seriousness.

Arguments against

Nuance and qualifications

The bill’s expanded evidence-collection scope should be tested against protections including the privilege against self-incrimination, despite having passed the Attorney-General’s Bill of Rights review.

Bill text

Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill

Version published August 10, 2026 00:00.

Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Act 2026 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990. 4 Section 2 amended (Interpretation) In section 2, insert in their appropriate alphabetical order: access , in relation to a computer system, means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, receive data from, or otherwise make use of any of the resources of the computer system access information includes codes, passwords, encryption keys, and any related information that enables access to a computer system or any other data storage device computer system — a means— i a computer; or ii 2 or more interconnected computers; or iii any communication links between computers or to remote terminals or another device; or iv 2 or more interconnected computers combined with any communication links between computers or to remote terminals or any other device; and b includes any part of the items described in paragraph (a) and all related input, output, processing, storage, software, or communication fac…
Read full bill text
Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Act 2026 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990. 4 Section 2 amended (Interpretation) In section 2, insert in their appropriate alphabetical order: access , in relation to a computer system, means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, receive data from, or otherwise make use of any of the resources of the computer system access information includes codes, passwords, encryption keys, and any related information that enables access to a computer system or any other data storage device computer system — a means— i a computer; or ii 2 or more interconnected computers; or iii any communication links between computers or to remote terminals or another device; or iv 2 or more interconnected computers combined with any communication links between computers or to remote terminals or any other device; and b includes any part of the items described in paragraph (a) and all related input, output, processing, storage, software, or communication facilities, and stored data evidential material has the same meaning as in section 3(1) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 issuing officer has the same meaning as in section 3(1) of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 remote access search means a search of a thing such as an internet data storage facility that does not have a physical address that a person can enter and search thing includes an intangible thing (for example, an email address or access information to an internet data storage facility) In section 2, insert as subsection (2): 2 For the purposes of the definition of computer system in subsection (1) , a computer is interconnected with another computer if it can be lawfully used to provide access to that other computer— a with or without access information; and b whether or not either or both computers are currently turned on; and c whether or not access is currently occurring. 5 New section 3A inserted (Transitional, savings, and related provisions) After section 3, insert: 3A Transitional, savings, and related provisions The transitional, savings, and related provisions set out in Schedule 1 have effect according to their terms. 6 Section 10 amended (Power to obtain search warrant) Replace section 10(1) with: 1 The Director may, by application in writing, apply for a warrant to search any place or other thing specified in the application. 1A An application for a warrant must contain, in reasonable detail, the following particulars: a the grounds on which the application is made (including the reasons why the legal requirements for issuing the warrant are believed by the Director to be satisfied): b the address or another description of the place or other thing proposed to be entered, or entered and searched, inspected, or examined: c a description of the item or items or other evidential material believed to be in or on the place or other thing that are sought by the Director. 1B The issuing officer— a may require the Director to supply further information concerning the grounds on which the search warrant is sought; but b must not, in any circumstances, require the Director to disclose the name, address, or any other identifying detail of an informant unless, and only to the extent that, such information is necessary for the issuing officer to assess either or both of the following: i the credibility of the informant: ii whether there is a proper basis for issuing the warrant. 1C The Director must disclose in the application— a details of any other application for a search warrant that the Director knows to have been made within the previous 3 months in respect of the place or other thing proposed to be searched; and b the result of that application or those applications. 1D However, an issuing officer may allow an application for a search warrant to be made orally (for example, by telephone call) or by personal appearance and excuse the applicant from putting all or any part of the application (including any required material) in writing if— a the issuing officer is satisfied that the delay that would be caused by requiring an applicant to put all or any part of the application (including any required material) in writing would compromise the effectiveness of the search; and b the issuing officer is satisfied that the question of whether the warrant should be issued can properly be determined on the basis of an oral communication or a personal appearance. In section 10(2), replace Judge with issuing officer . In section 10(2)(b), after place , insert or in or on the other thing . Replace section 10(3) with: 3 Part 3 applies to any warrant issued under this section. 4 If the warrant is intended to authorise a remote access search, the warrant must contain, in reasonable detail, any access information that identifies the thing to be searched remotely. 6 Section 10 replaced (Power to obtain search warrant) Replace section 10 with: 10 Application for search warrant 1 The Director may, by application in writing, apply for a warrant to search any place or other thing specified in the application. 2 An application for a warrant must contain, in reasonable detail, the following particulars: a the grounds on which the application is made (including the reasons why the Director believes that the legal requirements for issuing the warrant have been satisfied): b the address or another description of the place or other thing proposed to be entered, entered and searched, inspected, or examined: c a description of the item or items or other evidential material believed to be in or on the place or other thing that are sought by the Director: d the period for which the warrant is sought. 3 The issuing officer— a may require the Director to supply further information concerning the grounds on which the search warrant is sought; but b must not, in any circumstances, require the Director to disclose the name, address, or any other identifying detail of an informant unless, and only to the extent that, such information is necessary for the issuing officer to assess either or both of the following: i the credibility of the informant: ii whether there is a proper basis for issuing the warrant. 4 The Director must disclose in the application— a details of any other application for a search warrant that the Director knows to have been made within the previous 3 months in respect of the place or other thing proposed to be searched; and b the result of that application or those applications. 5 However, an issuing officer may allow an application for a search warrant to be made orally (for example, by telephone call) or by personal appearance and excuse the applicant from putting all or any part of the application (including any required material) in writing if— a the issuing officer is satisfied that the delay that would be caused by requiring an applicant to put all or any part of the application (including any required material) in writing would compromise the effectiveness of the search; and b the issuing officer is satisfied that the question of whether the warrant should be issued can properly be determined on the basis of an oral communication or a personal appearance; and c the information required by subsections (2) to (4) is supplied (whether orally, or partly orally and partly in writing) to the issuing officer. 6 An issuing officer who allows an application for a search warrant to be made under subsection (5) must record the grounds for the application as soon as practicable. 10A Issuing of search warrant 1 An issuing officer may issue a warrant in the prescribed form if satisfied that— a there are reasonable grounds for believing— i that any information supplied pursuant to section 9 is false or misleading in a material particular; or ii that a person has failed to comply with any obligation imposed pursuant to section 9; or iii that it is not practicable to serve a notice under section 9 by reason of the fact that the person cannot be located, is absent from New Zealand, or any other good cause; or iv that the service of a notice under section 9 might seriously prejudice the investigation; and b there are reasonable grounds for believing that there may be, at the place or in or on the other thing specified in the application, any documents or other thing that may be relevant to an investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud. 2 The issuing officer may authorise the search warrant to be executed on more than 1 occasion during the period in which the warrant is in force if satisfied that this is required for the purposes for which the warrant is being issued. 3 Every warrant must contain, in reasonable detail, the following particulars: a the period during which the warrant may be executed, being— i a period specified by the issuing officer not exceeding 14 days from the date of issue; or ii if the issuing officer is satisfied that a period of longer than 14 days is necessary for execution, a period specified by the issuing officer not exceeding 30 days from the date of issue: b if the warrant may be executed on more than 1 occasion, the number of times that the warrant may be executed: c if the warrant is intended to authorise a remote access search, any access information that identifies the thing to be searched remotely. 4 However, the issuing officer may not issue a search warrant authorising the remote access search of a thing unless the issuing officer is satisfied that the thing is not located at a physical address that a person can enter and search. 5 Sections 12A to 28 apply to any warrant issued under this section. 10B Retention of documents A copy (whether in electronic form or otherwise) of every written application for a search warrant made under section 10(1) , or (in the case of an oral application) the record of the application made by the issuing officer under section 10(6) , must be retained under the control of the Registrar of the office of the District Court at which, or under the control of the Registrar of the office of the District Court that is closest to the place at which, the application was made until,— a in a case where a search warrant is issued, the completion of any proceedings in respect of which the validity of the warrant may be in issue; or b in any other case, the expiry of 2 years after the records were first retained under the control of the Registrar of the District Court. 7 Section 12 and cross-heading replaced Replace section 12 and the cross-heading above section 12 with: Provision relating to warrants issued under Part 1 12 Effect of warrant issued under Part 1 1 Every warrant issued under Part 1 authorises the person exercising the warrant— a to enter and search the place specified in the warrant on 1 occasion within 14 days of the issue of the warrant at any time that is reasonable in the circumstances: b to use any assistance that is reasonable in the circumstances: c to use any force both for gaining entry and for breaking open anything in or on the place searched that is reasonable in the circumstances: d to search for and remove any documents or other thing that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud: e where necessary, to take copies of any documents, or extracts from documents, that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation: f where necessary, to require any person to reproduce, or to assist any person executing the warrant to reproduce, in usable form, any information recorded or stored in any such documents. 2 Every person called upon to assist the person or persons executing the warrant has the powers contained in subsection (1)(c) and (d) . 3 Any warrant issued under Part 1 is subject to any reasonable conditions that the issuer specifies in the warrant. 12AA Disclosure of previous applications Any person applying for a warrant under Part 1 must, having made reasonable enquiries, disclose on the application— a details of any other applications for a warrant that that person knows to have been made within the previous 28 days by a member of the Serious Fraud Office in respect of the place specified; and b the result of that application or those applications. Provisions relating to warrants issued under Part 2 12A Effect of warrant issued under Part 2 1 Every warrant issued under Part 2 authorises the person (other than a constable) exercising the warrant— a to enter and search the place or other thing specified in the warrant on 1 occasion within 14 days of the issue of the warrant at any time that is reasonable in the circumstances on the number of occasions and within the period set out in the warrant : b to request any person to assist with the entry and search (including, without limitation, a member of a hapū or an iwi if the place to be entered is of cultural or spiritual significance to that hapū or iwi): c to use any force both for gaining entry and for breaking open anything in or on the place or other thing searched that is reasonable in the circumstances: c to use any force in respect of any property that is reasonable for the purposes of carrying out the entry and search and any lawful seizure: d to search for and remove any documents or other thing that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud: e to bring and use in or on the place or other thing searched any equipment, to use any equipment found in or on the place or other thing, and to extract any electricity from the place or other thing to operate the equipment that it is reasonable to use in the circumstances, for the purpose of carrying out the entry and search: f to use any reasonable measures to access a computer system or other data storage device located (in whole or in part) at the place or other thing if any intangible material that is the subject of the search may be in that computer system or other device: g if any intangible material accessed under paragraph (f) is the subject of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, to copy that material (including by means of previewing, cloning, or other forensic methods either before or after removal for examination): h where necessary, to take copies of any documents, or extracts from documents, that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation: i where necessary, to require any person to reproduce, or to assist any person executing the warrant to reproduce, in usable form, any information recorded or stored in any such documents. 2 Any warrant issued under Part 2 is subject to any reasonable conditions that the issuer specifies in the warrant. 12B Remote access search of thing authorised by warrant issued under Part 2 Every person (other than a constable) executing a warrant issued under Part 2 authorising a remote access search may— a use reasonable measures to gain access to the thing to be searched; and b if any intangible material in the thing is the subject of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, copy that material (including by means of previewing, cloning, or other forensic methods). 12BA Identifications and notice requirements for remote access search 1 Every person (other than a constable) who executes a warrant issued under Part 2 authorising a remote access search must, on completion of the search, send an electronic message to the email address of the thing searched— a attaching a copy of the search warrant; and b setting out the following particulars: i the date and time of the commencement and completion of the search: ii the name and unique identifier of the person who had overall responsibility for that search: iii the address of the office to which inquiries should be made. 2 If the person conducting the search is unable to deliver the electronic message required by subsection (1) (or it is returned undelivered), the person must take all reasonable steps to identify the user of the thing searched and to send the information referred to in subsection (1)(a) and (b) to that person. 12C Powers of person called to assist 1 Every person (other than a constable) called on to assist a person (other than a constable) exercising a warrant issued under Part 2 is subject to the control of the person with overall responsibility for exercising that warrant. 2 Every person (other than a constable) called on to assist a person exercising a warrant issued under Part 2 may— a enter and search the place or other thing specified in the warrant: b while under the direction of the person exercising the warrant, use reasonable force in respect of any property for the purpose of carrying out the entry and search and any lawful seizure: c search for and remove any documents or other things that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud: d use any reasonable measures to access a computer system or other data storage device located (in whole or in part) at the place or other thing if any intangible material that is the subject of the search may be in that computer system or other device: e if any intangible material accessed under paragraph (d) is the subject of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, copy that material (including by means of previewing, cloning, or other forensic methods either before or after removal for examination). 3 Every person (other than a constable) called on to assist a person (other than a constable) executing a warrant issued under Part 2 authorising a remote access search may— a use reasonable measures to gain access to the thing to be searched; and b if any intangible material in the thing is the subject of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, copy that material (including by means of previewing, cloning, or other forensic methods). 12D Securing place or other thing to be searched 1 Every person (other than a constable) executing a warrant issued under Part 2 may, in a manner and for a duration that is reasonable for the purpose of executing the warrant,— a secure the place or other thing searched, any area in or on that place or other thing, or any thing found in or on that place or other thing: b exclude any person from the place or other thing searched, or from any area within the place or other thing, or give any other reasonable direction to such a person, if the person executing the warrant has reasonable grounds to believe that the person will obstruct or hinder the exercise of any power under this subsection. 2 A person (other than a constable) who exercises any power under subsection (1) must, on the request of any person affected by the exercise of the power,— a identify themselves either by name or by unique identifier; and b identify this Act and state the reason for the search unless it is impracticable to do so in the circumstances; and c if not in Police uniform, produce evidence of his or her their identity. 12E Powers of constable executing, or assisting in execution of, warrant issued under Part 2 The provisions of Part 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 apply to a constable who is executing a warrant issued under Part 2, or assisting in the execution of a warrant issued under Part 2, with any references to the exercise of a search power deemed to refer to the execution of a warrant issued under Part 2. 12F Limitation on exercise of powers To avoid doubt, the powers conferred by sections 12A(1)(c) and 12C(2)(b) do not authorise the application of force to any person. General provisions relating to warrants 7A Section 13 replaced (Return of documents) Replace section 13 with: 13 Return of documents and things A person who, in executing any warrant issued under this Act, removes any document or thing pursuant to the warrant must return the document, a copy of that document, or the thing as soon as practicable to the person who previously had the document or thing in their possession or under their control. 13A Disposal of forensic copies 1 A person who makes a forensic copy of any data held in a computer system or other data storage device must, if the person determines that the data does not contain any evidential material, ensure that the forensic copy and any copies made from that copy are deleted, erased, or otherwise destroyed in a way that prevents retrieval of the copy or copies by any method. 2 However, if an examination of the data shows that it contains a mixture of data that is evidential material and data that is not evidential material,— a the forensic copy of the data and any copies made of that copy may be retained in their entirety; and b the forensic copy and any copies made of that copy may continue to be searched, if such a search was authorised by the search power under which the data was seized and copied. 7B Section 14 repealed Repeal section 14. 8 Section 22 amended (Effect of final decision that exercise of powers unlawful) Replace section 22(3) with: 3 No information, and no documents or extracts from documents, or other things, obtained as a consequence of the exercise of any powers conferred by this Act that have been declared to be unlawful, and no record of any such information or document,— a are admissible as evidence in any criminal proceedings if the evidence is excluded under section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006: b may otherwise be used in connection with the exercise of any power conferred by this Act unless the court that declared the exercise of the powers to be unlawful is satisfied that there was no unfairness in obtaining the evidence. 9 New Schedule 1 inserted Insert the Schedule 1 set out in Schedule 1 of this Act as the first schedule to appear after the last section of the principal Act. 10 Principal Act amended This subpart amends the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. 11 Schedule 2 amended In Schedule 2, after the item relating to section 270 of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, insert: The following table is small in size and has 4 columns. This table amends Schedule 2 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and should be read with table to provide understanding of the context. Serious Fraud Office Act 1990 10 Constable may obtain and execute warrant to search for and seize any evidential material in respect of offence involving serious or complex fraud All 12 Principal regulations amended This subpart amends the Serious Fraud Office (Prescribed Forms) Regulations 1990. 13 Schedule amended In the Schedule, replace form 4 with the form 4 set out in Schedule 2 of this Act. 1 New Schedule 1 inserted into Serious Fraud Office Act 1990 1 s 3A Transitional, savings, and related provisions 1 Provisions relating to Serious Fraud Office Amendment Act 2026 1 Interpretation In this Part,— Act means the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990 amendment Act means the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Act 2026 commencement means the commencement of the amendment Act. 2 Effect of commencement on existing criminal proceedings 1 This clause applies to any criminal proceedings that have commenced (within the meaning of section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011) before commencement. 2 Section 22(3) of this Act as it was immediately before commencement applies to those criminal proceedings. 1 Transitional, savings, and related provisions 2 Form 4 in Schedule of Serious Fraud Office (Prescribed Forms) Regulations 1990 replaced 4 r 6 Search warrant (Issued under section 10 of the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990) Investigation into the affairs of [ specify the person whose affairs are being investigated ] ( or investigation relating to [ specify suspected offence ]) To [ name of constable ] or every constable or [ name of designated member of Serious Fraud Office ] or every designated member of the Serious Fraud Office. 1 This warrant is issued following an application in writing by [ name of applicant ] in respect of [ place or other thing ]. 2 I, [ name of issuing officer ], am satisfied— a that there are reasonable grounds for believing— *(i) that information supplied pursuant to section 9 of the Act is false or misleading in a material particular; or *(ii) that [ name ] has failed to comply with an obligation imposed pursuant to section 9 of the Act; or *(iii) that it is not practicable to serve a notice under section 9 of the Act by reason of the fact that [ name ] cannot be located or is absent from New Zealand or other good cause; or *(iv) that the service of a notice under section 9 of the Act might seriously prejudice the investigation; and b that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there may be, at [ place or other thing ], any documents or other thing that may be relevant to an investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud. 3 This warrant authorises you (unless you are a constable)— a to enter and search [ place or other thing ] specified in the warrant on 1 occasion [ number of occasions ] within 14 [ number ] days of the issue of the warrant at any time that is reasonable in the circumstances: b to request any person to assist with the entry and search (including, without limitation, a member of a hapū or an iwi if the place to be entered is of cultural or spiritual significance to that hapū or iwi): c to use any force both for gaining entry and for breaking open anything in or on the place or thing searched that is reasonable in the circumstances: c to use any force in respect of any property that is reasonable for the purposes of carrying out the entry and search and any lawful seizure: d to search for and remove any documents or other thing that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation or may be evidence of any offence involving serious or complex fraud: e to bring and use in or on the place or other thing searched any equipment, to use any equipment found in or on the place or other thing, and to extract any electricity from the place or other thing to operate the equipment that it is reasonable to use in the circumstances, for the purpose of carrying out the entry and search: f to use any reasonable measures to access a computer system or other data storage device located (in whole or in part) at the place or other thing if any intangible material that is the subject of the search may be in that computer system or other device: g if any intangible material accessed under paragraph (f) is the subject of the search or may otherwise be lawfully seized, to copy that material (including by means of previewing, cloning, or other forensic methods either before or after removal for examination): h where necessary, to take copies of any documents, or extracts from documents, that the person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant to the investigation: i where necessary, to require any person to reproduce, or to assist any person executing the warrant to reproduce, in usable form, any information recorded or stored in any such documents. 4 If you are a constable executing this warrant or assisting in the execution of this warrant, the provisions of Part 4 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 apply with any references to the exercise of a search power deemed to refer to the execution of this warrant. 5 This warrant is subject to the following conditions [ specify any conditions imposed ]. Dated at: [ place, date ] [ Signature ] Issuing officer   *Omit this paragraph if not applicable.

Hansard

April 30, 2026

Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill — First Reading · Full day report

First Reading Hon MARK MITCHELL (Minister of Police) (14:59): on behalf of the Minister of Justice: I move, That the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Justice Committee to consider the bill. At the appropriate time I intend to move that the bill be reported to the House by 31 August 2026. It’s estimated that crime results in billions of dollars in losses every year and causes untold harm to countless hard-working New Zealanders and businesses. It is not uncommon to read media stories of retirees deprived of their savings or businesses destroyed by the actions of fraudsters. The scale and complexity of fraud is increasing. It challenges the ability of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute the fraudsters who commit this crime. It is critical that our laws adapt to this change in context, including advances in technology and how fraud is committed. This Government is committed to fixing the basics in law and order. Doing so requires penalties to reflect the seriousness of the crimes committed and ensuring offenders are held accountable for the harm they cause to their victims. It also means ensuring law enforcement agencies have the t…
Read full Hansard debate
First Reading Hon MARK MITCHELL (Minister of Police) (14:59): on behalf of the Minister of Justice: I move, That the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Justice Committee to consider the bill. At the appropriate time I intend to move that the bill be reported to the House by 31 August 2026. It’s estimated that crime results in billions of dollars in losses every year and causes untold harm to countless hard-working New Zealanders and businesses. It is not uncommon to read media stories of retirees deprived of their savings or businesses destroyed by the actions of fraudsters. The scale and complexity of fraud is increasing. It challenges the ability of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute the fraudsters who commit this crime. It is critical that our laws adapt to this change in context, including advances in technology and how fraud is committed. This Government is committed to fixing the basics in law and order. Doing so requires penalties to reflect the seriousness of the crimes committed and ensuring offenders are held accountable for the harm they cause to their victims. It also means ensuring law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to hold criminals to account and to prevent more New Zealanders from becoming victims of fraud and corruption. The Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill aims to do just that. The bill amends the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990, which established the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), and gives it the modern powers it needs to investigate serious and complex fraud and corruption. The SFO Act has not been substantively updated since it passed 36 years ago. Since then, the technological environment has changed; evidence of fraud is increasingly digital, meaning investigations involve information stored on devices and in the cloud. Criminal justice legislation has also moved on, with modern approaches to law enforcement agencies, undertaking searches, and how the courts consider evidence. The SFO Act has simply not kept up. Outdated parts of the Act are directly affecting the ability of the SFO to fulfil its functions: to address fraud and corruption in New Zealand. The bill is targeted to act quickly and address the issues that are creating the biggest challenges for the SFO. These are to do with search warrant powers and the legal test for evidence admissibility in the Act. The bill updates three key elements of the search warrant framework. First, the bill ensures the SFO can obtain the types of evidence it needs in an investigation. When the SFO Act was passed in 1990, evidence of fraud was almost exclusively paper based. Searches tended to be for documents, papers, and ledgers stored in filing cabinets in offices. However, evidence of fraud today is increasingly digital—on computers and smartphones, in accounting software, and stored in the cloud. The current settings mean the SFO faces unhelpful barriers to obtaining important digital evidence from devices and the cloud. The bill addresses this. Second, the bill makes the search warrant application process more efficient. Under the existing process, a warrant application can only be made in writing and to a judge. This takes time and means the SFO cannot always act quickly enough to preserve evidence that might be at risk of being destroyed or tampered with before a search is executed. The bill enables the SFO to act quickly and efficiently, to do its searches by empowering oral warrant applications, and allowing these to be made to an issuing officer, such as a community magistrate or other judicial officer who has been authorised by the Attorney-General. Third, the bill ensures the SFO can manage a physical warrant scene, like a residence or office. Right now, it can be difficult for the SFO to manage its warrant scenes and access important things like electricity or internet on site. This risks the integrity of the evidence and can endanger investigators. These changes make it clear that investigators can give reasonable directions to exclude people from a warrant site and to access electricity or an internet connection if needed in the search. The bill also makes it clear that police can use all their usual powers under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 when assisting the SFO to execute a warrant. This ensures police have all the tools they need to help the SFO do its searches safely and effectively. The changes to the warrant settings bring SFO search powers to the same level as similar enforcement agencies, like the Financial Markets Authority. We’ve modelled the changes on the comparable provisions in the Search and Surveillance Act, which is where those other enforcement agencies’ powers sit. The bill also updates the evidence test used in the SFO Act. The courts use the test to determine whether certain evidence can be used in a case. The test is used when a law enforcement agency may not have followed all the rules when gathering the evidence. The existing test in the Act reflects the approach taken in 1990. The law has since moved on. The bill changes the legal test to reflect the more recent and widely applied test from the Evidence Act 2006. We’re confident that the approach in the Evidence Act provides a more balanced legal test. It allows the court to consider a range of important factors when considering if evidence should be admissible. Those factors include whether urgency or safety was a factor in obtaining the evidence and the seriousness of the offending. Changing the test in this way brings the SFO into line with the standard approach and ensures its Act is consistent with other criminal justice legislation. This bill gives the SFO the powers it needs to investigate and prosecute serious fraud and corruption in the digital age. They are powers held and used regularly by other enforcement agencies. Central to this is ensuring law enforcement agencies, such as the SFO, have the tools they need to hold fraudsters to account for their crimes and the harm they cause to their victims. I commend this bill to the House. SPEAKER: The question is that the motion be agreed to. Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central) (15:06): Thank you, Mr Speaker. We are going to support that this bill go to select committee for examination. We agree that the Serious Fraud Office does a very important job, and we are heartened that the Government wants to make sure that, essentially, white-collar criminals—fraudsters, people engaging in corruption—are subject to the full force of the law, because it’s an important part of our law enforcement framework. We have some concerns. Every time a court criticises the conduct of a law enforcement agency, the response of the Government is to broaden the powers of that agency. We’re seeing that in respect of the Policing Amendment Bill and the illegal taking of photographs. Now what we are seeing here is that the Court of Appeal on R v Pikia found that the Serious Fraud Office was exercising powers that it simply didn’t have in demanding the delivery of devices by various notices under the Act. It’s worth observing that it’s a somewhat unusual situation where you have almost every enforcement agency having powers of search and surveillance under the Search and Surveillance Act. The very purpose of that Act when it was passed was to bring together search and surveillance powers from all kinds of enforcement agencies—whether it be Agriculture or Fisheries or Police or Customs—to make sure they had one consistent set of principles. Now, we’ve got this outlier organisation, the Serious Fraud Office, which has retained quite extensive but differently framed powers. We agree that it’s appropriate to look at this to make sure they do have the powers which are appropriate so that they can do their job. Clearly, as the Minister noted, the ability to search electronic devices and to demand the production of documents that are stored electronically is part of that. I was also interested to hear the Minister talk about the test for wrongfully obtained evidence. In fact, New Zealand is an outlier, because in most jurisdictions, if evidence is obtained illegally, it can’t be used in a proceeding. In the United States, this is called the “fruit of the poisoned tree” doctrine, where you can’t go and illegally enter a property, find a document or a bloodied weapon, knowing that you’re not allowed to be there, and then turn up to court and present it as evidence. New Zealand takes not a slightly different—a radically different—approach. It basically says, in the Search and Surveillance Act, “Well, how good is the evidence? How serious is the crime? What were the circumstances when you chose not to follow the law and illegally seized that evidence?”, and balances that up and says, “Well, that’s a pretty serious thing. All you did was enter an open back door without an invitation, and, therefore, we think you should allow it in.” That’s actually conceptually a very challenging thing to do. Steven Joyce would be proud of a search being a little bit illegal. But we are going to have a look at that at select committee, at least in respect of Serious Fraud Office searches. I do have concerns that any situation where enforcement officers know that if they act illegally, the consequences will not be significant—they’ll probably still be allowed to use that evidence—raises real problems about the incentives that that sets. But as we said, we think this is a bill that deserves scrutiny. We do want to make sure that it isn’t just giving them more powers because they haven’t got enough money. That’s a genuine question for the Serious Fraud Office, which is a tiny institution, given the magnitude of its task. With that, we look forward to a thorough examination of this bill before committee. Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green) (15:11): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand to also support this bill through its first reading. For you, Mr Speaker, you’re going to be hearing a reasonably similar speech to the previous speaker, the Hon Dr Duncan Webb. In terms of the context, the bill itself, in terms of the expanded scope of the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO’s) search abilities, and particularly the ability to enable the SFO to obtain necessary digital evidence and apply the more modern evidence test in terms of evidence admissibility, is an important aspect, as we heard from the Minister, in being able to keep up with other areas and other agencies. I do think that the previous speaker, the Hon Dr Duncan Webb, has raised a couple of issues that are quite important. The first one is that we do see this sort of continuous catch-up game in terms of something that was ruled in court and then the Government catching up in terms of the admissibility of evidence or the expanded scope required to ensure that something like that doesn’t happen again. I think, as part of the select committee process, we’ll be really interested to know whether the Minister of Justice is doing any proactive work to anticipate something that happens rather than continuously being reactive and rather than taking a proactive approach. But just on the case I was referring to here, I think it is important to raise that part of this bill did come about in the 2024 Court of Appeal case with Crown and Pikia, and particularly around the way that the evidence was being collected. I think it is important to mention that case in conjunction with a number of other cases, because while we see certain agencies—like the Police, which has far greater resources—as part of the review process or Estimates hearings, we do constantly hear from SFO, and we as a select committee question SFO, in terms of the ability for them to undertake the job that they’re doing with the limited resources that they have. What we also saw previously when we had the justice cluster, for example, where SFO was able to work more collaboratively with other agencies in terms of a more coordinated approach—we do see that justice cluster has also wrapped up. Now we don’t know what the next necessary step is for SFO, the Minister of Justice, Police, Corrections, etc., to actually all come together to address some of these issues as well. With that, I think what is important to note, and something to tease out as part of the select committee stage, is this idea of evidence admissibility. I want to raise the particular example I think the previous speakers mentioned in terms of the fruit of the poisoned tree. Particularly, we saw that in the case of Hamed and Ors and Crown in the 2011 Supreme Court ruling, where evidence was collected incorrectly under the then Search and Surveillance Act, which then was amended in 2012. That admissibility is going to be a key factor if you have an agency who has limited resources to be able to undertake some of that. So it is whether, then, as part of this bill, although there is the expanded scope, the SFO is able to ensure that we don’t see that evidence inadmissibility as we go through the court system. Because, again, the cases the SFO deals with, on average, are those kinds of white-collar crimes and are the kind of things that are incredibly complex and, also, incredibly costly to go through. It’s one of the reasons why this country, Aotearoa New Zealand, doesn’t see many successful convictions when it comes to white-collar crimes; because it’s incredibly costly for the Crown to actually undertake some of those trials and some of those court processes. Finally, part of that is how is this potentially—you know, seeing the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) report. It has passed the Attorney-General’s BORA report, but there’s always this idea that—you know, we’re now looking at this expanded scope of search and the collection of evidence around privilege against self-incrimination, so I think that’s also an important factor to consider as we’re going through the select committee process. The Green Party does support this bill at present, and we look forward to additional contributions from officials, Ministers, and the submitters on this bill during the select committee. TODD STEPHENSON (ACT) (15:16): Thank you, Mr Speaker, I rise take a short call on behalf of ACT on the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill. This is a bill to modernise some aspects of the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990. The Minister has well traversed the details and, since I’m on the Justice Committee, I will get to well traverse those details in a lot of detail when it comes before the committee. It sounds like parties across Parliament are actually going to support it to the select committee, which is great, because that will allow us to do that work. Obviously, financial crimes are serious. We want to make sure we give the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) the tools to tackle those crimes, and it is really making sure that the legislation keeps up with modern technologies and things that they need to be doing to collect evidence and surveillance, etc. From ACT’s perspective, this is going to be potentially fixing what matters: a loophole in the current powers of the SFO. Financial or white-collar crime isn’t victimless. It does undermine trust. It does actually drive up costs, and we want to make sure our hard-working New Zealanders aren’t hit in the pocket. I look forward to discussing this further at the select committee, but I commend this bill to the House. JAMIE ARBUCKLE (NZ First) (15:17): Thank you, Mr Speaker, I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to support the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill. This bill helps fulfil our coalition agreement commitments to restore law and order. It gives the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) the necessary tools to address financial crime—and that’s what we are talking about within this bill, financial crime. It gives search powers into a modern world, and this world is changing quickly, especially in this space, around the digital nature. So giving the required search powers that are required to the Serious Fraud Office is very important. What I did want to discuss a little bit was that just prior to Christmas, the Serious Fraud Office came and spoke to the Justice Committee. it was their Long-term Insights Briefing. They did talk a lot about the explosion—what they really said, the explosion—of fraud around the world. But we can stand—I can stand—here in this House, and New Zealand is classed across the world as having very low levels of corruption and fraud, and all of us in this House want to keep that this way. So giving the Serious Fraud Office this ability in today’s world is only sensible. We realise, also, that often the Serious Fraud Office deal with very serious and complex fraud, bribery, and corruption. It’s not just in the public sector it works in but it also works across the private sector, as well. One thing, also, is the role of the Serious Fraud Office is about preventing fraud and corruption, and giving it the right tools will detract these people from actually even thinking about entering into these types of crimes. The bill deals with two pressing issues around the search warrants and evidence admissibility. As previous speakers have said, the select committee process—and I’m a member of the Justice Committee—will be the right place to examine those issues. I commend this bill to the House. CARL BATES (National—Whanganui) (15:20): Thanks, Mr Speaker. Restoring law and order in New Zealand is more than just removing gang patches, which we’ve done, and sorting out antisocial road-users, which is in progress. It’s also about supporting those constituents who come into our offices and tell us about the stories of how they have been scammed online and the difficulties that have occurred in trying to catch the criminals that have scammed them and taken away their money and their mana. This bill is going to support actually finding those people, capturing them, and making sure they are held accountable for their actions. I therefore commend it to the House. Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū) (15:21): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s very good to follow the call of Carl Bates, the member for Whanganui, because the tone of Mr Bates’ contribution says something about this Government’s approach to the politics of law and order, which I want to say something about. As my colleagues have said, the Labour Party is supporting this bill to select committee for further examination. You can read that as a kind of qualified, time-bound support to send this bill off so we can look under the hood and give critical scrutiny to the provisions of this bill. On the surface of it, at face value, and from what we’ve heard from the Minister and Government members today, it would seem to be simply a modernisation of the legal framework that the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) operates under, particularly in relation to powers of search and surveillance and, secondly, the admissibility of evidence—but is it? We’ve heard from a number of colleagues, and we’ve heard the story of the Court of Appeal’s findings in relation to the case of Roger Pikia, which was really the thing that instigated the policy process that led to this bill coming to the House today. The Court of Appeal was scathing, I think it’s fair to say, about the Serious Fraud Office acting beyond its powers. The court said that the SFO “gathered more than a million documents relating to Mr Pikia’s dealings over a seven-year period, few of which were relevant to the organisation … The indiscriminate use of warrants was the antithesis of the correct approach, which requires the provision of as much specificity as is reasonably possible in the circumstances and targeting only information relevant to the frauds under investigation”. It was a fishing trip of industrial scale. My colleague Duncan Webb talked about the habit that the current Government has whenever a court criticises a law enforcement agency for the way they do their work and with regard to their powers under the law. The response of this Government is simply to retrospectively make all that legal by expanding the powers. I’ll be interested to hear how the Justice Committee get on with teasing out whether this is, in fact, a justified codification and setting out of the specific powers that the Serious Fraud Office needs, in the digital age, to do their job properly. A cursory reading of the new search provisions, which allow digital items to be the subject of a warrant, and so on, makes sense, but I’ll be very interested to hear the select committees report back to the House on whether or not it is simply that, or is it just an expansion and a loosening of the controls? When you read the provisions in this bill, it would be an understatement to say they’re comprehensive. These provisions would allow the Serious Fraud Office to go to the doctor, and woe betide anyone who finds themselves on the receiving end of an SFO search warrant, because if they use all of their powers, there won’t be much left of the place or the person that’s being searched. Finally, I want to just make this point: the Serious Fraud Office is a tiny organisation. The question that I have for Government members is, yep, you want to expand the powers available to the Serious Fraud Office, but do you think the office is adequately funded to do its work? Or is this bill just another example of performative politics by the Government in relation to law and order—of being seen to be on the job by changing the law and expanding powers but not actually— Rima Nakhle: Mr Speaker—Mr Speaker. Hon PHIL TWYFORD: —but not actually resourcing the agency to do its job properly. Rima Nakhle: Thank you, Mr Speaker. SPEAKER: No, no. Hang on a minute. I decide when he’s finished—no one else. RIMA NAKHLE (National—Takanini) (15:26): Sorry—thank you, Mr Speaker. Fraud is the fastest-growing crime in New Zealand, amounting to almost 30 percent of all crime committed. Although we’ve been in Government for less than three years, we recognised very quickly that something needed to be done to give the Serious Fraud Office the authority to tackle this fastest-growing crime. It’s incumbent on us, and I commend this bill to the House. DAN ROSEWARNE (Labour) (15:26): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Labour Party to speak on the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill at its first reading. As mentioned by my colleagues, Labour will be supporting this bill to the select committee. Being new to the Justice Committee, I’m looking forward to fleshing out this bill and learning about its implications. When I was doing study for this bill, I came across this graph. It shows that, in 2003, the Serious Fraud Office reported expected serious fraud levels at $200 million. By 2023, this figure had risen to $5 billion. This 25-fold increase over two decades illustrates the consequences of the Serious Fraud Office and other Government agencies failing to adopt technology-driven fraud prevention strategies and maintain continuous vigilance amongst emerging threats. It’s very, very important that we address this, and we do so because serious fraud is not a victimless crime. It is not some fringe offence that only happens on spreadsheets or in boardrooms. It hurts real people, it can wipe out savings, destroy trust and undermine confidence in our institutions, and leave ordinary New Zealanders paying the price. When a worker loses retirement savings through an investment scheme, that matters. When a small business is undercut by dishonest competitors, that matters. When the public loses confidence that the rules apply equally to everyone, that also matters as well. Labour supports strong enforcement against serious crime, we support agencies having fit-for-purpose tools, and we support modern laws that keep pace with technology. We also want to ensure that those who think they can cheat the system are held to account just as much as any other crime we see in our communities. That’s why we’re supporting this bill. The Serious Fraud Office Act dates back to 1990. Back then, the world looked very different. Records were on paper, filing cabinets filled offices across New Zealand, and letters were posted. Computers did exist, but nothing like the digital world we live in now. Today, evidence sits in cloud storage; it may be in encrypted accounts, and it may be spread across multiple devices—across multiple jurisdictions, actually—and across multiple platforms. Fraudsters can move money with a few clicks and hide communications behind multiple layers of technology. So it makes sense that the law should catch up with that. This bill modernises search warrant provisions so they better reflect the way information is now stored and accessed. It recognises that evidence may longer be sitting in a desk drawer or in a hard drive physically located in one office. It may be remote, it may be digital, it could be intangible, and it’s also fast moving. So addressing this is a sensible objective. This bill also seeks to align the admissibility of evidence provisions in the Serious Fraud Office Act with the broader and more modern framework under the Evidence Act 2006. Again, on the face of it, this is a sensible direction. Consistency across the legal system matters, clarity matters, and modern evidential standards matter. So there are many useful and practical elements within this legislation. But supporting the bill to select committee is not the same as writing a blank cheque, and this is where Labour’s role is important, because while the goal of tackling serious fraud is right, the powers given to the State must always be balanced with safeguards, accountability, and respect for civil liberties. That balance matters in everyday democracy, as we all know, and whenever Parliament gives search powers, surveillance powers, or remote access powers, or, for that matter, expanded evidential pathways, we should do that very carefully. We should ask the hard questions and test whether the drafting is proportionate in a way that the public will expect. So, for that reason, we commend the bill to the House. Dr HAMISH CAMPBELL (National—Ilam) (15:31): Excellent. It is my privilege to rise and speak in favour of the Serious Fraud Office Amendment Bill in this first reading, and it’s great to see support across the House for this bill. As already has been mentioned, fraud is one of the fastest growing crimes here in New Zealand, and we are definitely doing something about it. It’s estimated to cost billions of dollars. Of course, our Serious Fraud Office Act is over 36 years old; it’s time for it to be modified. Things have changed. The way crimes are happening is changing. This bill does that. Therefore, I commend it to the House. Motion agreed to. Bill read a first time.

Documents and supporting material