Parliament bill

Public Service Amendment Bill

Royal assent · Introduced by Hon Paul Goldsmith · National Party

Last checked
July 15, 2026 15:52
Source captured
July 15, 2026 15:52
Source
View on Parliament.nz

What this bill does

The bill passed its third reading 67–55; the vote was not unanimous. According to the Government’s stated rationale, the Public Service needs a clearer focus on delivering efficient, high-quality services and value for New Zealanders. The bill aims to focus the Public Service on supporting the Government’s policies, service delivery, constitutional government, and lawful conduct. The bill rewrites the public service purpose and sets detailed responsibilities for department chief executives, including advice, implementing lawful ministerial instructions, delivery, stewardship, integrity, and cross-agency work. It also gives the Public Service Commissioner greater roles in chief executive performance, designated key positions, misconduct oversight, and national-security vendor restrictions.

AI-assisted summary based on the bill text and linked Hansard debates.

Latest voting result

May 27, 2026
Third reading: Passed Party vote

Ayes 67 · Noes 55

  • National Party Aye · 48 votes
  • ACT Party Aye · 11 votes
  • NZ First Party Aye · 8 votes
  • Labour Party No · 34 votes
  • Green Party No · 15 votes
  • Te Pāti Māori No · 4 votes
  • Ferris, Tākuta No
  • Kapa-Kingi, Mariameno No

View the vote in Hansard

Arguments raised in Parliament

AI-assisted summary of the linked Hansard debates. Each point is grounded in the cited transcript.

Arguments for

For public-service chief executives, mandatory contestable reappointment processes are claimed to broaden the talent pool and secure the best-qualified leaders rather than automatic incumbents.

For Ministers and the public, requiring the Commissioner to publish chief-executive performance-review frameworks and consult on expectations is claimed to make performance management more robust and transparent.

For the Public Service and Parliament, replacing 34 agency long-term insights briefings with a DPMC briefing is claimed to eliminate overlapping work while concentrating long-term thinking and scrutiny.

For public-sector agencies, empowering the Commissioner to restrict specified products, services, or vendors is claimed to prevent malicious or disruptive actors from threatening national security or national interests.

Arguments against

For Parliament and the public, centralising long-term insights briefings at DPMC is argued to stop agency-specific papers being published and considered by select committees, reducing scrutiny and long-term strategic thinking.

For the Public Service workforce and the communities it serves, removing diversity and inclusion requirements is argued to reduce workforce diversity and weaken people’s ability to see themselves represented.

For the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group, fixed-term contracts are argued to reduce job security and make staff more likely to offer political rather than free and frank advice.

Nuance and qualifications

A single DPMC long-term insights briefing could add value by connecting agency issues, but DPMC should consult agencies widely and preserve issues that need public and parliamentary attention.

The bill’s requirement to take public-service chief-executive appointments to the market raises a consistency concern because a contemporaneous local-government bill would instead allow extended reappointments without going to market.

Bill text

Public Service Amendment Bill

Version published November 27, 2025 00:00.

Public Service Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Public Service Act 2020. 4 Section 3 amended (Purposes of this Act) In section 3(e),— a delete fundamental characteristic of the ; and b replace is acting with acts . 5 Section 4 amended (Guide to this Act) In section 4(2),— a after purpose of the public service, , insert the principal responsibilities of chief executives, ; and b delete acting with a spirit of service to the community, . In section 4(4),— a replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner ; and b after provisions relating to , insert key positions in the public service, . 6 Section 5 amended (Interpretation) In section 5, definition of Deputy Commissioner , replace a Deputy Public Service Commissioner with the Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 5, definition of public service employee , paragraph (a), replace sections 13 and with section . In section 5, definition of public service leader , replace a Deputy Commissioner wi…
Read full bill text
Public Service Amendment Bill The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 1 Title This Act is the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 . 2 Commencement This Act comes into force on the day after Royal assent. 3 Principal Act This Part amends the Public Service Act 2020. 4 Section 3 amended (Purposes of this Act) In section 3(e),— a delete fundamental characteristic of the ; and b replace is acting with acts . 5 Section 4 amended (Guide to this Act) In section 4(2),— a after purpose of the public service, , insert the principal responsibilities of chief executives, ; and b delete acting with a spirit of service to the community, . In section 4(4),— a replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner ; and b after provisions relating to , insert key positions in the public service, . 6 Section 5 amended (Interpretation) In section 5, definition of Deputy Commissioner , replace a Deputy Public Service Commissioner with the Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 5, definition of public service employee , paragraph (a), replace sections 13 and with section . In section 5, definition of public service leader , replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 7 Subpart 2 heading in Part 1 replaced In Part 1, replace the subpart 2 heading with: 2 Public service defined, purpose of the public service, principal responsibilities of chief executives, and public service principles 8 Cross-heading above section 10 repealed Repeal the cross-heading above section 10. 9 Cross-heading above section 11 repealed Repeal the cross-heading above section 11. 10 Section 11 replaced (Purpose) Replace section 11 with: 11 Purpose of the public service The public service— a supports the Government to develop and implement its policies, deliver high-quality and efficient public services, and meet the needs of New Zealanders; and b supports constitutional and democratic government and acts with a spirit of service to the community and in accordance with the law. 11 New section 11A inserted (Principal responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies) After section 11, insert: 11A Principal responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies 1 A chief executive of a department or departmental agency is responsible to the appropriate Minister for— a giving advice to Ministers; and b implementing Ministers’ lawful instructions; and c the efficient and economical delivery of the goods or services provided by their agency, the performance of the regulatory functions for which their agency is responsible, and how effectively those goods, services, and regulatory functions contribute to intended outcomes; and d the performance of the functions and duties and the exercise of the powers of the chief executive or of their agency (whether those functions, duties, or powers are imposed or conferred by an enactment or by the policies of the Government); and e the operation of their agency, including in carrying out the purpose of the public service under section 11 ; and f the financial stewardship of their agency, including building and maintaining a financially literate workforce; and g working to improve inter-operability, co-ordination, and collaboration across public service agencies; and h the integrity and conduct of the employees for whom the chief executive is responsible; and i their agency’s responsiveness on matters relating to the collective interests of government; and j supporting that Minister to act as a good steward of the public interest, including by— i maintaining public institutions, assets, and liabilities; and ii maintaining the currency of any legislation administered by their agency; and iii providing advice on the long-term implications of policies. 2 The chief executive of a department is not responsible for the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, of or by that part of the department that is a departmental agency hosted by the department unless expressly provided in this Act or another enactment. 3 The chief executive of a departmental agency is responsible for the performance of functions and duties, and the exercise of powers, by that part of the department that is the departmental agency only and not any functions, duties, or powers of the host department unless expressly provided in this Act or another enactment. 4 The chief executive of a servicing department of an interdepartmental executive board is not responsible for the performance of functions or duties, or the exercise of powers, of or by the board unless provided in an enactment or delegated to the department under section 27 . 5 However, if the chief executive of a servicing department is also a member of the board, they also have full responsibilities as a member of the board. 12 Section 12 amended (Public service principles) Replace section 12(2) with: 2 Public service chief executives, boards of interdepartmental ventures, and interdepartmental executive boards are responsible for— a upholding the public service principles when carrying out their responsibilities and performing their functions; and b ensuring that any agencies they lead or perform some functions within also uphold the public service principles when carrying out their responsibilities and performing their functions. Repeal section 12(3) and (4). In section 12(5), replace subsections (2) to (4) with subsection (2) . 13 Section 13 repealed (Spirit of service to community) Repeal section 13. 14 Section 17 amended (Commissioner may set minimum standards of integrity and conduct) In the heading to section 17, replace may with must . Replace section 17(1) with: 1 The Commissioner must set minimum standards of integrity and conduct . relating to— a the public service principles; and b the public service values. 1A The Commissioner may set minimum standards of integrity and conduct may include standards relating to other matters consistent with section 11 . — a the public service principles: b the public service values. 15 Section 19 amended (Guidance on integrity and conduct) In section 19(1), replace agencies referred to in section 17(2) with agencies in the State services (except Crown Research Institutes and their subsidiaries) . 16 Section 24 amended (Functions, duties, and powers and working arrangements of departmental agencies) In section 24(6), replace section 52(2) and (3) , which relates to with section 11A(2) and (3) , which relates to . 17 Section 26 amended (Establishment and reorganisations of interdepartmental executive boards) After section 26(1)(c), insert: d if the date on which the board is to be disestablished is changed, amend the date on which the board is to be disestablished and the item in Part 3 of Schedule 2 relating to that board is consequentially repealed. Replace section 26(2)(d) with: d specify the date on which the board is to be disestablished and the item in Part 3 of Schedule 2 relating to that board is consequentially repealed. 18 Section 27 amended (Responsibilities, powers, and working arrangements of interdepartmental executive boards) In section 27(1)(a), replace section 52(1) (relating to general responsibilities of chief executives) with section 11A(1) (relating to principal responsibilities of chief executives) . In section 27(3), replace section 52(4) and (5) , which relates to with section 11A(4) and (5) , which relate to . 19 Section 34 amended (Responsibilities and powers of boards of interdepartmental ventures) In section 34(a), replace section 52(1) (relating to general responsibilities of chief executives) with section 11A(1) (relating to principal responsibilities of chief executives) . 20 Cross-heading above section 42 amended In the cross-heading above section 42, replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . 21 Section 44 amended (Commissioner’s general functions) In section 44(c), replace that reflects the diversity of the society it serves and to ensure fair and equitable employment, including by promoting with and to promote . 22 Section 45 amended (Duty to act independently when making decisions about public service chief executives) Replace section 45(1) and (2) with: When making decisions about individual chief executives, the Commissioner is not responsible to the Minister and must act independently, except as provided for in clauses 3, 6, 7, and 8 of Schedule 7 (relating to appointment, transfer, conditions of employment, and removal from office of chief executives). 23 Section 47 amended (Deputy Public Service Commissioners) Replace the heading to section 47 with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 47(1), replace Two Deputy Public Service Commissioners with A Deputy Public Service Commissioner . In section 47(3) and (6), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In section 47(4), replace either or both of the Deputy Commissioners with the Deputy Commissioner . In section 47(5), delete who has held the role longer . 24 Section 48 amended (Other terms and conditions of appointment in Schedule 4) In section 48, replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . 25 Section 49 amended (Commissioner is chief executive of Commission) In section 49(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . Replace section 49(3) with: 3 The Deputy Commissioner retains their office as Deputy Commissioner despite any delegation of all or part of the chief executive’s role. 26 Section 51 amended (Public service chief executives) After section 51(3)(a), insert: aa if the date on which the functional chief executive role is to be disestablished is changed, amend the date on which the role is to be disestablished and the item in Schedule 5 relating to that role is consequentially repealed: Replace section 51(4)(d) with: d specify the date on which the functional chief executive role is to be disestablished and the item in Schedule 5 relating to that role is consequentially repealed. 27 Section 52 repealed (General responsibilities of chief executives of departments and departmental agencies) Repeal section 52. 28 Section 53 amended (Functional chief executives) In section 53(1), replace Section 52(1) with Section 11A(1) . 29 Section 54 amended (Duty to act independently in employment matters) In section 54(1), replace section 52(1) with section 11A(1) . Replace section 54(2) with: 2 The independence required by subsection (1) is subject to— a the requirements in section 55A(3) to (5) relating to key positions; and b the requirement in section 70(1) that a chief executive have regard to the wishes of the relevant Minister when making decisions about ministerial staff. 30 New section 55A and cross-heading inserted After section 55, insert: Key positions 55A Key positions in the public service 1 The Commissioner may, after consulting the chief executive of a department or the board of an interdepartmental venture, designate as a key position a position in the department or interdepartmental venture that meets the criteria in subsection (2) . 2 For the purposes of this section and section 54(2)(a) , key position means a position in a department or an interdepartmental venture that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is key— a because it is critical to the performance of the public service; or b because of its potential to develop senior leaders. 3 The chief executive or the board may appoint an employee to a key position only with the Commissioner’s agreement. 4 The chief executive or the board must consult the Commissioner on the performance review of any employee appointed to a key position. 5 The chief executive or the board must notify the Commissioner of any intention to redesign, restructure, or otherwise change a key position. 6 The Commissioner must publish a list of key positions on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Commission. 31 Section 59 amended (Public service leadership team) In section 59(b), replace 2 Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . 32 New section 66A inserted (Public service employees: policy advisory group) After section 66, insert: 66A Public service employees: policy advisory group 1 In this section, policy advisory group means the group of advisers established within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet who provide advice directly to the Prime Minister about specific portfolios across the government. 2 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet may appoint employees to the policy advisory group on fixed-term employment agreements. 3 The following are each deemed to be a genuine reason for appointing employees to the policy advisory group on fixed-term employment agreements for the purposes of section 66(2)(a) of the Employment Relations Act 2000: a to enable periodic change in the composition of the policy advisory group for the purposes of developing leadership and advice capability in the public service: b to ensure that the policy advisory group comprises a complementary mix of advisory skills. 33 Section 68 amended (Public service employees: departmental agencies) Before section 68(1)(a)(i), insert: iaaa section 55A(3) to (5) (relating to key positions); and After section 68(1)(a)(vi), insert: via section 89A (application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations); and vib sections 89B to 89E (application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfers of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities); and vic section 94A (notification of misconduct or serious misconduct investigations); and Repeal section 68(1)(xii) and (xiii). 34 Section 73 amended (Chief executive of department and board of an interdepartmental venture to be good employer) Repeal section 73(2). Repeal section 73(3)(i) and (j). 35 Section 75 and cross-heading repealed Repeal section 75 and the cross-heading above section 75. 36 New cross-heading above section 86 inserted After section 85, insert: Transfer of employees between public service agencies and restrictions on redundancy payments 37 New sections 89A to 89E and cross-headings inserted After section 89, insert: Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 89A Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 1 This section limits which employees may be bound by a collective agreement that— a binds the chief executive or board of a department or an interdepartmental venture ( A ) before a transfer of functions from A to another department or interdepartmental venture ( B ) and that, as a consequence of clauses 2 and 3 of Schedule 9, binds the chief executive or board of B after that transfer of functions ( collective agreement A ); or b binds the chief executive or board of B before that transfer of functions ( collective agreement B ). 2 After that transfer of functions,— a the only employees of B who are entitled to be bound by or enforce collective agreement A are those employees who are appointed to a position as an employee in B that has been established (whether or not previously existing in A) to enable B to carry out the transferred functions; and b the only employees of B who are entitled to be bound by or enforce collective agreement B are those employees who hold, or are appointed to, a position as an employee other than a position referred to in paragraph (a) . 3 Subsection (2) does not bind an employee to a collective agreement, or entitle an employee to be bound by or enforce a collective agreement, if the employee would not otherwise be bound by, or be entitled to be bound by or enforce, that agreement. 4 This section limits which employees may be bound by collective agreements, and the coverage of those agreements, under sections 76 to 80 of this Act and sections 56(1), 57, 62(3), and 243 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. 5 This section does not apply to a collective agreement to the extent that the parties to the agreement agree otherwise. Application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfer of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities 89B Application of employee and reorganisation provisions to transfers of functions between public service agencies and Crown entities This section and sections 89C to 89E apply to a transfer of functions from a Crown entity to a public service agency and to a transfer of functions from a public service agency to a Crown entity. 89C Restriction of redundancy payments Sections 88(1) and (3) and 89 apply— a as if— i a reference to a public service employee were a reference to an employee of a Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture; and ii a reference to the employee’s current department or interdepartmental venture were a reference to the employee’s current Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture; and b with all other necessary modifications. 89D Application of reorganisation provisions to collective agreements 1 The provisions specified in subsections (2) and (3) (relating to reorganisations) apply to the extent that— a those provisions relate to a collective agreement that binds the chief executive of a Crown entity or department or the board of an interdepartmental venture before the transfer of the functions; and b that collective agreement applies to an employee whose position in the Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture ceases to exist as a result of the transfer of functions. 2 Clause 2(3) and (6) of Schedule 9 applies— a as if a reference to the public service agency whose functions have been transferred were a reference to the Crown entity or public service agency whose functions are being transferred; and b with all other necessary modifications. 3 Clause 3(3) of Schedule 9 applies— a as if a reference to the chief executive of the public service agency whose functions have been transferred were a reference to the board of the Crown entity, or the chief executive or board of the public service agency, whose functions have been transferred; and b with all other necessary modifications. 89E Application of collective agreements to employees following reorganisations 1 Section 89A applies to the extent that— a any collective agreement binds the chief executive of a Crown entity or department or the board of an interdepartmental venture before the transfer of the functions; and b that collective agreement applies to an employee whose position in the Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture ceases to exist as a result of the transfer of functions. 2 Section 89A applies in respect of the Crown entity, department, or interdepartmental venture that functions are transferred from— a as if any reference to department or interdepartmental venture A in that section were a reference to that Crown entity or department or interdepartmental venture; and b with all other necessary modifications. 38 New sections 94A and 94B and cross-heading inserted After section 94, insert: Notifying and reporting on misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 94A Notification of misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 1 A chief executive of a department or the board of an interdepartmental venture must notify the Commissioner before commencing an investigation into allegations of misconduct or serious misconduct by a senior public service employee. 2 The Commissioner may provide oversight and advice to the chief executive or the board on the interpretation and application of standards and guidance relating to integrity and conduct. 3 In this section, senior public service employee means a public service employee who reports directly to the chief executive or the board. 94B Reporting on misconduct or serious misconduct investigations 1 This section applies to the agencies referred to in section 17(2) (excluding school boards). 2 Each agency must give a report to the Commissioner on the outcome of all investigations into alleged misconduct or serious misconduct by employees of the agency that have ceased or are concluded before the end of a financial year, as soon as practicable after the end of that financial year. 3 The Commissioner may issue guidance on this reporting, including the format. 4 The Commissioner must use this information to prepare and publish a report annually on an Internet site maintained by, or on behalf of, the Commission. 5 In this section, school board has the meaning given in section 7(1)(d) of the Crown Entities Act 2004. 39 Section 97 amended (Government workforce policy: content) Repeal section 97(2)(e). 40 Section 103 amended (Offence to solicit or attempt to influence public service leaders) In section 103(3)(a), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 41 Section 104 amended (Immunity for chief executives and employees) In section 104(1), replace Public service chief executives, Deputy Commissioners, with The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, public service chief executives, . After section 104(1), insert: 1A The immunity in subsection (1) applies to public service chief executives acting in any capacity under this Act or any other Act or otherwise. 42 Schedule 1 amended In Schedule 1 ,— a insert the Part set out in the Schedule of this Act as the last Part; and b make all necessary consequential amendments. 43 Schedule 3 amended In Schedule 3, after clause 2(2), insert: 3 The Commissioner may recover from the public service agency or host department the actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Commission in conducting an investigation or inquiry. In Schedule 3, in the heading to clause 4, after Power to , insert require information, question employees, and . In Schedule 3, repeal clause 4(1)(a). In Schedule 3, after clause 4(1)(c), insert: d enter the premises of a public service agency. In Schedule 3, after clause 4(2), insert: 2A A person has the same privileges as witnesses in courts of law when— a producing information, documents, and files; and b giving information or particulars; and c answering questions. In Schedule 3, repeal clause 4(4). In Schedule 3, after clause 5, insert: Performance improvement reviews 5A Power to conduct performance improvement review 1 This clause applies to— a the public service; and b Crown entities named in Schedule 1 of the Crown Entities Act 2004; and c the New Zealand Police, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the Parliamentary Counsel Office. 2 The Commissioner may conduct— a an agency performance improvement review with the agreement of the appropriate or responsible Minister; or b a system performance improvement review with the agreement of the Minister. 3 The Commissioner may recover from the agency or agencies, as applicable, the actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Commissioner in conducting the performance improvement review. 4 In this clause,— agency performance improvement review means an independent review of the performance of an agency, including the agency’s delivery of government priorities, core functions, and organisational management system performance improvement review means an independent review of the performance of a group of agencies, including how the agencies work together to deliver shared outcomes. Directions to manage risks to national interest and national security 5B Meaning of classified security information 1 In this schedule, unless the context otherwise requires, classified security information means information held by a specified agency that the head of the specified agency certifies in writing cannot be disclosed under this Act (except as expressly authorised by or under an Act or other rule of law) because— a the information is information of a kind specified in subclause (2) ; and b disclosure of the information would be disclosure of a kind specified in subclause (3) . 2 Information falls within subclause (1)(a) if it— a might lead to the identification, or provide details, of the source of the information, the nature, content, or scope of the information, or the nature or type of the assistance or operational methods available to the specified agency; or b is about particular operations that have been undertaken, or are being or are proposed to be undertaken, in pursuance of any of the functions of the specified agency; or c has been provided to the specified agency by the Government of another country, an agency of the Government of another country, or an international organisation, and is information that the specified agency cannot disclose because the Government, agency, or organisation that has provided the information will not consent to the disclosure. 3 Disclosure of information falls within subclause (1)(b) if the disclosure would be likely— a to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of New Zealand; or b to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of another country, an agency of the Government of another country, or an international organisation; or c to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial; or d to endanger the safety of any person. 4 In this schedule, in relation to classified security information,— head of the specified agency means, as applicable, the Director-General of Security, the Director-General of the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade specified agency means, as applicable, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 5C Power to issue direction to manage risks to national security and national interest 1 The Commissioner may, if the Commissioner considers it necessary to manage risk to national security or the national interest, issue to 1 or more relevant agencies a direction to restrict (including prohibit) the use of a specified vendor, service, or product, or specified class of vendors, services, or products, by or within those agencies. 2 Classified security information may be relied on in making a decision to issue a direction under subclause (1) . 3 The Commissioner must, before issuing a direction under this clause,— a seek advice from public service chief executives, including— i the Director-General of Security, the Director-General of the Government Communications Security Bureau, and the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, regarding risk to national security; and ii the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, regarding New Zealand’s international obligations and relationships; and b consult the Minister. 4 In issuing a direction, the Commissioner must have regard to— a the nature and extent of the risk to national security and the nature and extent of the risk to the national interest; and b the principle that the direction should be proportional to the nature of the risk; and c the anticipated benefits to New Zealand from preventing, sufficiently mitigating, or removing the risk; and d New Zealand’s international obligations and relationships; and e the effect of the direction on the relevant agencies, or on the individuals working within those agencies, as users of the vendor, service, or product, or the class of vendors, services, or products; and f the effect that the direction may have on markets and trade; and g any other matters the Commissioner considers relevant. 5 An agency to which a direction issued under this clause applies must comply with the direction. 6 In this clause,— protective security requirements has the meaning given in section 4(1) of the Inspector-General of Defence Act 2023 relevant agency means— a a public service agency: b an agency directed to implement the protective security requirements. 5D Commissioner may issue guidance to State services The Commissioner may, if they issue a direction under clause 5C(1) , issue to 1 or more agencies in the State services guidance concerning the use, by or within those agencies, of the relevant specified vendor, service, or product, or specified class of vendors, services, or products. 5E Affected person must be notified of direction 1 In this clause, affected person means, in relation to a direction issued under clause 5C(1) , any of the following persons: a a vendor who is specified in the direction: b a provider of a service that is specified in the direction: c a manufacturer or a developer of a product that is specified in the direction. 2 This clause applies if a direction has been issued under clause 5C(1) and an affected person or a representative of an affected person is in New Zealand. 3 The Commissioner must, if practicable, give notice (in the prescribed form (if any)) to the affected person or their representative that the direction has been issued. 4 A notice under subclause (3) must be given as soon as practicable after the direction has been issued. 5 If the Commissioner relies on classified security information in making a decision to issue the direction, the notice given under subclause (3) must state that— a the Commissioner relied on that kind of information; and b the affected person may request a summary (a CSI summary ) of the classified security information. 6 The purpose of the CSI summary is to enable the affected person to have a sufficient understanding of— a the classified security information the Commissioner relied on in making the decision (without that information being disclosed to the affected person); and b the reasons for the decision based on that information. 7 If the affected person requests a CSI summary,— a the Commissioner and the head of the specified agency that holds the classified security information must agree on the contents of the summary; and b the Commissioner must provide the agreed summary to the affected person within a reasonable time. 8 However, the Commissioner may refuse to provide a CSI summary if the Commissioner and the head of the specified agency are satisfied that a summary that is sufficient to meet its purpose cannot be provided without disclosing classified security information. 5F Proceedings involving classified security information 1 This section applies to any civil proceedings (including public law and judicial review proceedings) in a court relating to a direction issued under clause 5C(1) . 2 If the Crown proposes to present classified security information in proceedings, the Attorney-General must— a make an application to an authorised court under section 32 of the 2022 Act for a security information order to protect the confidentiality of the information to be given as evidence in the proceedings; and b submit to the court the certification described in clause 5B(1) . 3 If the classified security information is also national security information, the Crown may submit with the application and certification referred to in subclause (2) an NSI certificate under section 41 of the 2022 Act and seek a security information order as set out in section 36(3) of that Act (under which the types of orders available to the court are limited). 4 In this section,— 2022 Act means the Security Information in Proceedings Act 2022 authorised court, national security information, NSI certificate, and security information order have the meanings set out in section 4 of the 2022 Act. In Schedule 3, replace clause 6(3)(d) with: d the powers under clause 5C (relating to issuing a direction to manage risk to national security and the national interest); or da the powers under clause 3 of Schedule 7 (relating to the appointment of public service chief executives); or In Schedule 3, repeal clause 16(4)(a)(v). 44 Schedule 4 amended In the Schedule 4 heading, replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 1(1), replace the 2 Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clauses 1(2) and (3), 2(1), 4(1) and (2), and 5(1) and (2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 2(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 3(1), replace Deputy Commissioners with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 4, clause 6(1), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner in each place. In Schedule 4, clause 6(2), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . 45 Schedule 6 amended In Schedule 6, replace clause 2(4)(c) with: c an individual working in the public service as one of the following in relation to a function of the public service: i a secondee from elsewhere in the State services; or ii a contractor; or iii an employee of an employer who has a contract or other arrangement with the chief executive under which the employee performs work for the benefit of the chief executive and the chief executive is the controlling third party within the meaning given to that term in section 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. In Schedule 6, replace clause 8(1) with: 1 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must give a long-term insights briefing to the Prime Minister and the Minister at least once in every 3-year period beginning on the commencement date 1 June 2026 and must do so independently of all Ministers. In Schedule 6, repeal clause 8(4). In Schedule 6, repeal clause 8(5). In Schedule 6, clause 8(6), delete by a department or departments . In Schedule 6, clause 8(7), after The , insert Prime . In Schedule 6, after clause 8(7), insert: 8 In subclause (1) , commencement date means the date on which subclause (1) comes into force. In Schedule 6, clause 9(1), replace A chief executive with The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet . In Schedule 6, replace clause 9(1) with: 1 The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must undertake public consultation on a draft of the long-term insights briefing. In Schedule 6, clause 9(2), replace A chief executive with The chief executive . In Schedule 6, after clause 9, insert: Long-term thinking in policy development 10 Long-term thinking in policy development The chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet must issue guidance to other chief executives to— a support long-term thinking in policy development; and b increase the capability of the public service to undertake long-term thinking in policy development. Business continuity management 11 Public service agencies must have business continuity management in place 1 A chief executive of a department or departmental agency, an interdepartmental executive board, or a board of an interdepartmental venture must— a ensure their agency has business continuity management in place that will enable it to deliver its critical functions and services during and after any disruption (including but not limited to an emergency); and b make available to the Commissioner in writing, on request, its plan for functioning during and after a disruption. 2 For the purposes of this section, emergency has the meaning given in section 4 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. 46 Schedule 7 amended In Schedule 7, clause 3(1), replace clauses 4, 5, and 11 with clause 11 . In Schedule 7, clause 3(4)(a), replace a Deputy Commissioner with Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 7, replace clause 3(4)(b) with: b the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner (whoever is not also the chairperson), or a public service chief executive, or an employee of the Commission; and In Schedule 7, clause 3(7), delete and diversity and inclusiveness . In Schedule 7, replace clause 3(15)(c) with: c the chairperson must appoint the person and publish in the Gazette without delay— i notice of the Governor-General’s direction under paragraph (a) to appoint the person; and ii notice of the appointment. In Schedule 7, repeal clauses 4 and 5. In Schedule 7, clause 6(1), replace a Deputy Commissioner with the Deputy Commissioner . In Schedule 7, replace clause 9(1)(b) with: b a chief executive is absent from duty (for whatever reason) and— i is unable to delegate their functions, duties, and powers under this Act to another person under clause 2 of Schedule 6; or ii agrees that the Commissioner make the appointment. In Schedule 7, replace clause 9(5) with: 5 The appointment of an acting chief executive ceases on the date on which a chief executive of a department or departmental agency, or a functional chief executive, takes office or returns to duty. In Schedule 7, after clause 9, insert: 9A Performance review framework The Commissioner must— a develop a framework, including the criteria and process, for conducting performance reviews of chief executives; and b consult the Minister on the framework; and c publish the framework on an Internet site maintained by, or on behalf of, the Commission. In Schedule 7, after clause 10(1), insert: 1A The Commissioner must consult, and have regard to any recommendations of, the appropriate Minister when— a setting the performance expectations of a chief executive, including the key performance indicators that the chief executive is expected to meet; and b reviewing the performance of the chief executive under this clause. In Schedule 7, clause 11(1) and (2), delete 4, . 47 Schedule 8 amended In Schedule 8, clause 4(2), delete , temporary, or casual . In Schedule 8, clause 5(2), delete be approved by the Commissioner and must . In Schedule 8, repeal clauses 7 to 11 and the cross-headings above clauses 7 and 8. 48 Principal Act Section 49 amends the Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018. 49 Section 33 amended (Reports: consultation and acting independently) In section 33(3)(a), replace section 52 with section 11A . 50 Principal Act Section 51 amends the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. 51 Section 58 repealed (Departments and interdepartmental ventures to prepare plans to continue functioning during and after emergency) Repeal section 58. 52 Principal Act Section 53 amends the Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998. 53 Section 22A amended (Chief executive to prepare monitoring framework) In section 22A(1)(a), replace section 52(1)(d) with section 11A(1)(j) . 54 Principal Act Sections 55 and 56 amend the Data and Statistics Act 2022. 55 Section 6 amended (Interpretation) In section 6, replace the definition of Statistician with: Statistician means the Government Statistician appointed under section 12 56 Section 12 amended (Government Statistician) Replace section 12(1) with: 1 A Government Statistician must be appointed by the Public Service Commissioner in accordance with clause 3(2) to (9) of Schedule 7 of the Public Service Act 2020. 1A Clause 3(10) to (15) of that schedule does not apply to the appointment of the Government Statistician. 57 Principal Act Section 58 amends the Education and Training Act 2020. 58 Section 463 amended (Chief Review Officer to perform certain functions) In section 463(1)(a)(ii) and (2)(b), replace section 52 with section 11A . 59 Principal Act Section 60 amends the Employment Relations Act 2000. 60 Section 194 amended (Application for review) In section 194(1), delete and 7 to 11 . 61 Principal Act Section 62 amends the Legislation Act 2019. 62 Section 106 amended (Chief executives must act independently and include statement of responsibility) In section 106(2), replace section 52 with section 11A . 62A Principal Act Section 62B amends the Policing Act 2008. 62B Section 100 replaced (Scope of review by Public Service Commissioner) Replace section 100 with: 100 Scope of review by Public Service Commissioner 1 This section applies if the Public Service Commissioner— a is directed or requested under clause 5 of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020 to carry out, under section 44(d)(ii) of that Act, a review of the performance of the Police; or b conducts, under clause 5A of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020, an agency performance improvement review of the Police or a system performance review that includes the Police. 2 The review may relate only to matters referred to in section 16(1) . 63 Principal Act Section 64 amends the Remuneration Authority Act 1977. 64 Schedule 4 amended In Schedule 4, replace Deputy Public Service Commissioners with Deputy Public Service Commissioner . 65 Principal Act Sections 66 and 67 amend the Security Information in Proceedings Act 2022. 66 Section 4 amended (Interpretation) In section 4, definition of classified security information , after paragraph (a), insert: aa clause 5B of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: In section 4, definition of security information or SI , after paragraph (a)(ii), insert: iia clause 5B of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: 67 Section 29 amended (Application of Part) After section 29(a)(ii), insert: iia clause 5F of Schedule 3 of the Public Service Act 2020: New Part 2 inserted into Schedule 1 2 Provisions relating to Public Service Amendment Act 2025 18 Transition to single Deputy Commissioner 1 In this clause,— Act means the Public Service Amendment Act 2025 commencement date means the date on which section 23 of the Act comes into force. 2 The person who is the longest serving Deputy Commissioner immediately before the commencement date is to be treated as the Deputy Commissioner under this Act on and after the commencement date. 3 The terms and conditions of appointment of that person that applied immediately before the commencement date continue to apply on and after the commencement date unless modified in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. 4 The role of the Deputy Commissioner who is not the longest serving immediately before the commencement date comes to an end at the close of the day before the commencement date.

Hansard

May 14, 2026

Public Service Amendment Bill · Full day report

Public Service Amendment Bill Hon JAMES MEAGER (Minister for Hunting and Fishing) (17:26): on behalf of the Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government: I move, That the Public Service Amendment Bill be now read a third time. This bill will ensure that the Public Service can efficiently and effectively serve the Government of the day to deliver maximum value for all New Zealanders. Public Service chief executives and their agencies are entrusted with significant taxpayer funding and have a critical role in delivering the Government’s priorities. The Government, on behalf of all New Zealanders, has a legitimate interest in how the Public Service Commissioner is driving performance across the system. The changes in this bill are about sharpening focus, clarifying responsibilities, and lifting performance while ensuring that the Public Service acts with professionalism, accountability, and integrity. This starts with refocusing the statutory purpose of the Public Service to get back to basics, delivering service and outcomes for taxpayers while supporting constitutional and democratic government. This focus does not change our commitment to the political neutrality of t…
Read full Hansard debate
Public Service Amendment Bill Hon JAMES MEAGER (Minister for Hunting and Fishing) (17:26): on behalf of the Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government: I move, That the Public Service Amendment Bill be now read a third time. This bill will ensure that the Public Service can efficiently and effectively serve the Government of the day to deliver maximum value for all New Zealanders. Public Service chief executives and their agencies are entrusted with significant taxpayer funding and have a critical role in delivering the Government’s priorities. The Government, on behalf of all New Zealanders, has a legitimate interest in how the Public Service Commissioner is driving performance across the system. The changes in this bill are about sharpening focus, clarifying responsibilities, and lifting performance while ensuring that the Public Service acts with professionalism, accountability, and integrity. This starts with refocusing the statutory purpose of the Public Service to get back to basics, delivering service and outcomes for taxpayers while supporting constitutional and democratic government. This focus does not change our commitment to the political neutrality of the Public Service and the provision of free and frank advice. These are enduring principles of our democracy and they are retained in the Act unchanged. Nor does it mean that long-term thinking will not be a core feature of the Public Service. The Act will retain the fundamental principle of stewardship and chief executives will still be required to provide support to their Minister by providing advice on the long-term implications of policies. However, a high-performing Public Service always starts with people, and the way that we appoint Public Service leaders and hold them to account matters. As such, this bill reaffirms the principle of merit-based appointments. It clarifies chief executive responsibilities, and it improves the mechanisms for performance management. Merit-based appointments mean drawing from the widest possible talent pool and selecting the best person for the job—not the most familiar or the candidate of least resilience but the person with the right skills, the right experience, and the right leadership qualities to deliver. To support this, the bill will remove the option of automatic reappointments for public chief executives and that will mean that all future reappointments will be subject to a contestable process. The bill will also strengthen the provisions around chief executive and agency performance management, requiring the commissioner to publish a clear framework for the performance review of chief executives and codifying the existing practice of consulting relevant Ministers when the commissioner is setting and reviewing performance expectations and key performance indicators. This will increase the robustness of the process and drive confidence and transparency for Ministers and for the public. These changes are not a politicisation of the Public Service—oh no. Chief executives will still be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the commissioner or their deputy. The commissioner will still be required to act independently when making decisions about individual chief executives and, like any other Public Service leader, they will still be bound by the principles of political neutrality and merit-based appointments. The bill will provide a specific mandate for performance improvement reviews of public sector agencies and reintroduce key positions, allowing the commissioner or other system leaders to play a role in the appointment and performance management for key back-office positions such as those in finance or digital leadership. The Public Service must also maintain the trust and confidence of the public and we need zero tolerance for inappropriate behaviour or for wrongdoing. The bill will require chief executives to notify the commissioner before undertaking investigations into serious misconduct of senior leaders, to ensure the timely advice about how standards of integrity and conduct should apply, and for agencies to report annually on such investigations overall. The bill also removes unnecessary prescription and duplication. It removes provisions relating to freedom from bias and remuneration and diversity inclusion in the Act. Most of these objectives are already substantially provided for in other laws, including the Human Rights Act, the Employment Relations Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the good employer obligations already embedded in the Public Service Act itself. The Government considers these objectives are something more appropriately addressed through the particular Government of the day’s workforce policy statement. Removing these provisions does not remove our commitment to the Public Service drawing from that widest possible talent pool and eliminating bias in recruitment. These things are the essence of merit-based appointment. Agencies will still be required to treat employees fairly and properly, still be required to maintain equal opportunity programmes, and still be required to recognise the employment requirements of different people, as they should. The bill also removes the need for each Public Service agency to prepare an individual long-term insights briefing in favour of one briefing prepared by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) on behalf of the Public Service. DPMC will provide guidance to the public sector to support capability and long-term thinking, but we do not think that we need 34 separate briefings with such considerable overlap and duplication. Rather, we think that it is better to ensure a focus on such thinking or enable parliamentary scrutiny of the executive to come from DPMC. Finally, the Public Service must be better prepared to manage for increasing strategic competition and risk. While it must continue to innovate and adapt to new technologies, this bill will empower the Public Service Commissioner to protect the Public Service from malicious or disruptive actors by restricting access to specific products, services, or vendors where necessary to protect national security or national interests. The Public Service exists to serve the Government of the day and to serve taxpayers—the people who fund and who rely on such services. This bill provides a targeted, practical set of amendments to restore purpose, discipline, and professionalism to the Public Service while preserving its constitutional role as a politically neutral institution. It focuses the Public Service on results, not on processes. With this bill, we will have a Public Service that is clear in its role, strong in its leadership, and better focused on its core mission to serve the Government of the day with the efficiency and integrity that New Zealanders deserve. I commend the bill to the House. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The question is that the motion be agreed to. CAMILLA BELICH (Labour) (17:33): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Well, this is a dark day for New Zealand’s Public Service. I want to take a moment in this third reading of the Public Service Amendment Bill to do a shout-out to New Zealand’s public servants. Under this Government, they have lost their jobs, they have undergone restructuring, and now they’re facing the very clear risk of the politicisation of something that is integral to New Zealand’s democracy. We do not support this bill, and I’ll go through the reasons why. This bill could have been an opportunity for a bipartisan project into how our Public Service can best serve New Zealanders and can best provide the neutral professional advice that they have provided for over 110 years in New Zealand. Instead, this bill is an attack on some of the greatest achievements of the Public Service, and there is a real risk that it will take New Zealand backwards in terms of what it achieves, and I’ll go through some of those things. I want to talk first about something which has been brushed over, I think, throughout the readings on this bill and also through the select committee process. That is, the fact that in this bill, the long-term insights briefing—there used to be 34 of those provided to the House; usefully used by this House to scrutinise the Government—will be turned back to one long-term insights briefing that is compiled by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. I just think we need to go into what those long-term insights briefings actually look at, because some of the subject matters that the long-term insights briefings have recently looked at are incredibly important for the long-term strategic thinking of this country. Some of the most recent examples that I just found when I was looking for some of the already published ones on the internet were things like technology in Corrections and in Defence; productivity—a huge issue for New Zealand; long-term resilience to hazards; Public Service integrity; sustainable and resilient fiscal policy through economic shocks; precision diagnosis in health; the future of New Zealand’s food sector; how biodiversity can thrive; national security; and long-term insights into imprisonment. I can’t think of a more relevant list of issues that New Zealand needs to be looking at. Sadly, because of this bill, those types of papers will not be produced and put before select committees. They will not be published for the public. You cannot tell me with a straight face—not you, Madam Speaker. One cannot be told or convinced that DPMC is going to go through all of those topics to the same extent as they are now. This is a clear loss in long-term thinking in New Zealand and a clear loss for scrutiny of this Parliament. Don’t just take our word for it on the Opposition; listen to the Clerk of the House. When the Clerk gave their submission to the Governance and Administration Committee, they said that this would be a loss of opportunity for the scrutiny of the executive. As I said at the beginning, it’s a sad day for the New Zealand Public Service and the New Zealand public. Another key change in this bill which I strongly disagree with is the fact that up until today—and hopefully this bill won’t pass today, but up until the passage of this bill—chief executives have been required to tackle pay equity. One of the reasons that they have done this is the Public Service has been a leader in pay inequality. Actually, it was the first anywhere in New Zealand to have a specific bill on equal pay. The Public Service has always been a leader on equal pay and it has always had a commitment to leading equal pay. The progress that we’ve seen in the reduction of the gender pay gap has been, in the main, due to the work that has been undertaken by the Public Service. This bill takes that backwards. It takes away the requirement for chief executives to make progress on pay equity. This doesn’t need to be repeated, but I will repeat it: this goes just after the Government has taken away pay equity from thousands of New Zealand women. Shame on this Government for another step backwards for equal rights for women. Another thing that this bill does is it gets rid of the diversity and inclusion requirements in the Public Service. We scrutinised this requirement at the Governance and Administration Committee. I asked officials, “Can you point to a single example when a public servant has not been appointed on the basis of merit?” They could not give one example. So I ask the Government: what is the basis for removing this excellent requirement that the Public Service represents the community it serves? It seems basic to me that that would be an ideal that we’d have of a Public Service. We can’t find a single example where that has not occurred, so why are we changing the law? What will this do? It’s likely to decrease the diversity of our Public Service workforce. It’s likely to decrease the reflection that New Zealanders see when they look towards their public servants. So I think that that in and of itself is shameful. It also leads to the potential for politicisation. We heard submissions from the Human Rights Commission and academics and people who represent Public Service workers about how this was a retrograde step. We heard about the fact that the PAG group, the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group, would now be appointed on fixed-term contracts, leading to lack of job security for them, and the increased likelihood that they may be minded to give political advice which is not free and frank. I must say, there’s no evidence that that has occurred at all to date, but this bill does make that situation and set up the conditions to make that more likely. Also for chief executives, they have to go through a new recruitment process every five years. If I was a chief executive and I was looking to be recruited and I had to impress the Minister, I just cannot believe that it wouldn’t go through the chief executive’s mind to try and reflect the politics of the Government of the day. I think that’s a shame, because I think that New Zealanders want a free and frank Public Service. They want political neutrality. It’s an important part of our democracy. That is another thing that is happening in this bill which I think is deeply shameful. Now, when we talk about public servants, I think it’s really important that we are not under the misapprehension that we are just talking about people who live in Wellington. A lot of public servants do live in Wellington, but this is something that is affecting New Zealanders throughout the country. I live in Auckland, and 30 percent of central government employees live in Auckland. I also looked at who is employed in the Public Service in our regions, and I think there are 1,627 in Northland; 464 in Taranaki; in Hawke’s Bay, 1,502; in Nelson, which happens to be in the South Island, 501; in Otago, 1523; Southland, 663—and it goes on. People around New Zealand are part of our Public Service; they are doing an excellent job, and this bill is really challenging the type of work that they do it, but unfortunately not in a bipartisan way. I want to reflect on that, too, if I can. This bill does go to the very heart of what a public servant is meant to be. We heard from a number of academics on how unfortunate it was that this was not used as an opportunity to come together across this Parliament—at a time when democratic institutions are being challenged again and again throughout the world—and to reaffirm New Zealand’s leadership in providing a free, fair, frank, politically neutral Public Service. Unfortunately, this was not the case. This bill was brought to the House by the previous Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government, Judith Collins; it’s now under the stewardship of the new Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government, Paul Goldsmith. I encourage that Minister, as he’s reading his papers, his briefing to the incoming Minister, to think, is this really the start he wants to make as Minister for the Public Service—putting in place a bill that not only gets rid of important diversity and inclusion mechanisms; it gets rid of long-term thinking in the public service. It makes it more likely that there is a challenge to political neutrality; it gets rid of job security; it takes away pay equity. That is not something that I would want on my record as Minister for the Public Service, and I encourage the current Minister to look at this bill and think about it and decide whether he actually wants to go through with what is clearly a backwards step that will take not only New Zealand backwards, and not only the Public Service backwards, but in fact the very essence of what makes New Zealand a wonderful, independent democracy. I cannot commend this bill to the House. RICARDO MENÉNDEZ MARCH (Green) (17:42): Thank you, Madam Speaker. We’re not supporting this bill—we’ve made that extremely clear—and I want to commend my colleague Francisco Hernandez, who has been leading the fight against this bill, both in the Governance and Administration Committee and out in the community. We support the comments made by many submitters, including the Public Service Association, that this is indeed a backwards step. I think there are several elements that I want to capture in my speech as to why I think this does not deliver better outcomes for everyday people. I think the term “efficiency” does not accurately, in my view, describe the fact that ultimately what this bill actually ends up doing is undermining the public sector’s drive towards achieving, for example things like pay equity and closing the gender and ethnic pay gaps. It tries to, in my view, paint these changes as wanting to create a Public Service that is based on merit, but as the previous speaker, Camilla Belich, pointed out, when evidence was sought that appointments were not being made on the basis of merit, there was no evidence that could be presented to support that argument. What I find particularly concerning is that the Government is wanting to dismantle provisions to achieve like pay equity or to work towards, for example, better representing disabled people within the public sector, while at the very same time, Ministers are getting found in the courts for unlawfully appointing people to lead the Human Rights Commission. I think there is a bit of a disconnect between what they have aimed for the Public Service, but then what they are actually doing themselves when it comes to appointing specific roles. One of the things that I think it worth mentioning, and this was touched on by the previous speaker, is the downgrading of long-term insights briefings. I want to acknowledge the Clerk and the Office of the Clerk for their submission on this, because we do also agree that the shifting of these long-term insights briefings from dozens of agencies to just the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) will actually also represent backwards steps for adequate scrutiny. These long-term insights briefing represent the ability for agencies to provide a long-term vision that then, yeah, sure, parliamentarians can scrutinise. These long-term insights briefings may contain nuggets of information and goals that perhaps not every MP in this House will agree with, but they serve as a blueprint for MPs to then be able to scrutinise that very same direction, those very same goals, and whether the long-terms insights and goals that those agencies have actually marry up to political parties’ different objectives. I think particularly of first-term MPs in their first scrutiny week and their ability to scrutinise Government; those documents serve as a really useful tool. I don’t think parliamentarians should be expected to come into this place with a full breadth of knowledge of every agency and every goal that every agency has—I don’t think that’s reasonable. Those documents actually support adequate scrutiny and actually support a much more representative democracy and Parliament by enabling people from all backgrounds to engage on the long-term goals of different agencies. To simply pretend that DPMC will have the capacity those long-term goals—I don’t think it’s adequate. When I’m door-knocking out in the electorate of Mt Albert, I often hear people wanting a cross-partisan approach and long-term vision for our Government agencies. I think the downgrading of these long-term insights briefings is against the feedback that I think many of us receive, no matter our party colours, and this downgrading is really, really problematic. I talked a bit about the issue around pay equity and inclusion clauses. Now, this whole debate around DEI—diversity, equity, and inclusion—I think, unfortunately, has moved away from a conversation about how could, for example, make our workplaces more accessible for disabled people. For example, how can we create workplaces that are genuinely able to accommodate neurodivergent people? How can we create workplaces that can better accommodate people with invisible disabilities—or visible? How can we make sure that our workplaces, our literal physical spaces, are accessible for people who may need to use a wheelchair, or who may even be injured. Those disabilities may not be lifelong. Instead, we’ve had this shift from those issues to imported culture wars, and these sorts of debates have become less about empowerment and removing barriers and more about claims of efforts being made to appoint people not on the basis of merit. When you don’t have policies in place that genuinely include disabled people, we inherently default to exclusion. Disabled people particularly, I think—and I want to echo the Disabled Persons Assembly that these approaches to remove barriers to disabled people are, and I quote, “essential to delivering fair and effective public services that are sensitive to the needs of all New Zealanders. The public service does its job well and is legitimate because it represents our diverse country”. Achieving this, in my view, is simply about having a Public Service that every New Zealander could see themselves working in and serving the needs of people and the front lines. On pay equity—the goal, I would say, of every workplace should be around closing and eliminating the gender pay gap. I particularly remember, in my first term, canvassing the efforts that were made by different agencies around (a) even identifying gender and ethnic pay gaps, and (b) addressing them. I think the changes on clauses 21, 34, 39, and 46 are counterproductive to achieving these goals. We know that we cannot just default to assuming that the gender and ethnic pay gaps will close or be eliminated just through the status quo, but that we need policies in place that help address these. Public sector agencies have done, I think, quite good work in leading the way on this. The removal of these references around equity and pay equity, in my view, are also deeply, deeply problematic. Now my colleague Francisco Hernandez has, in his differing view that he put on our behalf, also noted that the removal and the deletion of references around successive Governments’ long-term public interests are also problematic. This goes back to something that I think many people pointed out and which I kind of touched on at the beginning: that not having references around long-term public interest defaults to the short-term thinking that often leads to decisions being made without future generations being taken into account. In this Parliament, I think that is particularly problematic because we have three-year terms, which means that decisions that are not made with the long-term public interest are made in particularly short-term thinking because Governments try to then create things that they can see outcomes in the short term without necessarily always reflecting on long-term benefits. An example of this, I would say, would be the tax cuts that were delivered under this term of Government, where, sure, some people—particularly those on higher incomes—may see some short-term gains, but we know that those short-term gains have come at the long-term expense of the ability for public services to deliver for everyday people. When we don’t have public services that are mandated to take that approach of long-term thinking and, particularly, long-term public interest, we also degrade the ability to keep public services for the public good. We also open the way for political agendas that may deem to take some of these public services into the private sector, which, as the evidence points out, hasn’t resulted in better outcomes or affordable services for everyday people. Just to close off, I want to commend all the organisations that submitted on this bill. I think this is one of those bills that, unless you have worked in the Public Service, serving people, it can be particularly difficult to get your head around what the language means in terms of actual outcomes, in terms of goals, and in terms of agendas, but I think submitters have captured their concerns extremely well. Once again, the Green Party stands with the Public Service workers who I know come to work every day wanting to do well for their community and thinking of that very same long-term public interest. I know that many of them will continue to hold those values, but my concern is that the people at the top will, due to this, now not be able to reflect them. Thank you. SIMON COURT (ACT) (17:53): The ACT Party supports this bill because at its core, it’s about restoring focus to the Public Service. It should not be controversial to say the Public Service exists to serve the democratically elected Government of the day and to deliver quality services for New Zealanders, but after the last few years, apparently, this has to be written back into the law. Too many New Zealanders are looking at the Public Service today and asking a very fair question: with all of these extra staff—tens of thousands hired under the previous Labour and Green Government—why did results get worse and why are we still not getting the services our taxpayer dollars are paying for? The purpose of the Public Service is straightforward: deliver efficient services, support the Government, act professionally and demonstrate at all times political neutrality, and, above all, focus on outcomes for New Zealanders paying the bills for the Public Service. That is what this legislation reinforces. ACT has long argued that New Zealanders deserve a Public Service based on competence, advancement, and merit, not ideology and not identity politics, as the member Camilla Belich was championing in her speech. The taxpayer does not care what box a public servant ticks on a diversity spreadsheet. They care whether they can see meaningful changes in their own lives and the lives of their families based on the work that Public Service is doing, and this bill makes important changes to deliver on that. And that is what New Zealanders have voted for these coalition parties in Government to do, and that is what we are doing today. This bill reinforces that political neutrality is paramount, and merit-based appointments are the only way to advance in the public sector. It strengthens performance expectations for chief executives and clarifies responsibilities for the Public Service. Frankly, all this is long overdue because under Labour and the Greens we saw a Public Service that was distracted. It was not delivering for ordinary New Zealanders trying to get ahead. ACT believes in a simple proposition: New Zealand works best when people are judged on their ability and the results they deliver, not on their identity, and the Public Service is meant to do just that. ACT is proud to support this legislation because it moves New Zealand back towards a culture of responsibility, professionalism, and service. It puts the focus back where it belongs: on the needs of New Zealanders. I commend this bill to the House. DEPUTY SPEAKER: This debate is interrupted and is set down for resumption next sitting day. The House stands adjourned until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, 19 May 2026. Debate interrupted. The House adjourned at 5.56 p.m.

Documents and supporting material